Existing empirical evidence has frequently observed that professional forecasters are conservative and display herding behaviour. Whilst a large number of papers have considered equities as well as macroeconomic series, few have considered the accuracy of forecasts in alternative asset classes such as real estate. We consider the accuracy of forecasts for the UK commercial real estate market over the period 1999-2011. The results illustrate that forecasters display a tendency to under-estimate growth rates during strong market conditions and over-estimate when the market is performing poorly. This conservatism not only results in smoothed estimates but also implies that forecasters display herding behaviour. There is also a marked difference in the relative accuracy of capital and total returns versus rental figures. Whilst rental growth forecasts are relatively accurate, considerable inaccuracy is observed with respect to capital value and total returns.
1: Introduction
Over the course of the last two decades real estate has become a more mainstream asset class and in turn sophistication in the investment process has increased. In today's environment the majority of major investors utilise forecasts in some form in their asset allocation decision making.
Not only do many institutions have their own in-house forecasters, but a large number of advisory firms and dedicated research organizations add to this intellectual capital and expertise within the real estate industry. The increased use, and importance, of forecasts has been mirrored by the expansion of quantitative modelling research in the academic literature. However, despite the increased awareness of the potential role of forecasting, in both a professional and academic context, very few papers have examined the accuracy of professional forecasts in real estate.
This lack of empirical examination is in contrast to the large literature concerned with the accuracy and characteristics of forecasts in the equity markets 1 . However, real estate provides an interesting and quite different context in which to consider the accuracy of forecasts. The nature of both its pricing and trading as a privately traded asset is in marked contrast to the equity markets.
Specifically, as both a real and investment asset, real estate combines elements from the macroeconomy and the capital markets. In many respects, real estate has more behavioural characteristics in common with macro-economic series than equities. In particular, real estate data has long been recognized to display smoothing (e.g. Geltner, 1991 Geltner, , 1993 which contributes to reduced volatility in comparison with exchange traded assets such as stocks. The nature of the forecasting process also differs with emphasis on overall market conditions and trends in contrast to estimates of individual company. Therefore, in many respects a greater parallel exists with the literature to have considered the accuracy of macro-economic forecasting rather than the literature concerning stocks 2 .
The analysis in this paper is based upon both consensus and individual forecasts collected by the Investment Property Forum (IPF), a UK based industry body. The results highlight that forecasters tend to display conservatism in their published forecasts, with the result that they under-estimated the growth rates observed during the strong market conditions up to 2007, and under-estimated the extent of the subsequent fall in values. These findings may be possibly linked to herding and a reluctance to provide extreme forecasts. It also noticeable that greater accuracy is observed in the case of the rental (income) return forecasts in comparison to those for capital and total returns. This is possibly due to difficulty in accurately gauging and incorporating factors such as investment behaviour and flow of funds and their consequent impact on yields and capital values. This impact is shown by the low frequency in which the IPF Consensus Forecasts for capital and total returns outperform simple naive forecasts. In addition, when the underlying individual forecasts are considered, the forecast ranges are much larger than with the corresponding rental growth figures.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the pertinent issues in both the broad forecasting literature as well as those limited number of papers to have specifically considered real estate. Section 3 describes the data analysed in the paper. The empirical analysis is broken into two primary components. The first provides an initial examination of the accuracy of both the IPF Consensus as well as the dispersion and variation of the individual forecasts. The second element compares the performance of the consensus versus simple naive forecasts. Section 6 discusses in more depth some of the broader implications that arise from the empirical findings, and in particular possible causes behind the heightened inaccuracy displayed with respect to capital and total return forecasts. The final section provides concluding comments.
2: Literature Review
The macroeconomic forecasting literature has highlighted a variety of factors that may contribute to, and explain, variations in forecast accuracy. There will inevitably be variations across empirical approaches and model choice; however, Oller & Barot (2000) , Hendry & Clements (2003) and note several possible reasons as to why models may fail to provide accurate forecasts, including model mis-specification and issues such as the use of inaccurate data. In addition, the presence of structural breaks may affect the deterministic trend. For example, both Stock & Watson (1993) and Fintzen & Stekler (1999) note that series that had previously managed to capture anticipated economic downturns failed to do so for the 1990 recession in the United States.
The characteristics and the behaviour of individual forecasters is a further key element that may affect forecasting performance and is subject to a large number of empirical papers. Gjaltema (2001) argues that forecasters are distinctive entities with individual characteristics that can influence forecast outcomes. Furthermore, Fintzen & Stekler (1999) argue that the manner in which individuals prepare their forecasts can affect their accuracy. Gallimore & McAllister (2005) pinpoint five key areas where judgemental, or behavioural elements may come into play in the forecasting process.
These are i) during model formation, ii) during model evaluation, iii) in the evaluation of provisional forecasts, iv) in the production of pure judgemental forecasts and v) by users implementing the forecasts 3 . One key behavioural element is that forecasters may deliberately bias their forecasts. There are a number of studies that have argued that forecasters may not necessarily attempt to maximize forecast accuracy and may be motivated by factors such as their reputation when they release forecasts for policy reasons. Whilst consider equity analysts forecasts, their findings are consistent with the above. They argue that the prospects of promotion inside a firm guide analysts towards optimistic forecasts. A factor that possibly contributes to this is that optimistic forecasts may help generate trading activity. Dechow et al. (2000) provides supporting evidence in the context of forecasts from banks. The results illustrate that forecasts tend to be more optimistic when concerned with firms with whom the bank has a business relationship in comparison to forecasts produced by 'de-motivated' forecasters. note that the publicity that occurs on the release of a forecast may affect the outcome, leading possibly to deliberately biased forecasts. Gallimore & McAllister (2005) provide qualitative evidence, based on structured interviews, to support such behaviour occurring in a real estate context. Some participants expressed a reluctance to provide downbeat negative forecasts due to the anticipated response of end-users. Such findings are supportive of the incentive concavity theory which would suggest that the rewards from making an accurate but bold forecast are smaller than the penalties of an inaccurate bold forecast . This often therefore leads to herding and a clustering of forecasts around the consensus 5 . The rationale behind forecasters herding around the consensus may also vary depending on market conditions. Inaccurate forecasts possibly avoid undue attention when conditions are strong as market participants may be concentrating on the good news of 'better than expected results'. In poor investment market conditions, worse than forecast figures may be blamed upon 'the market'. These behavioural characteristic may lead to forecasters under-estimating growth rates when the market out-performs and vice-versa (Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993) .
The resulting smoothing that may occur in forecasts also arises due to the statistical properties of optimal forecasts which state that the variance of the forecasts must be less than the variance of the actual values (Mincer & Zarnowitz, 1969; Samuelson, 1976) . However, Smyth & Ash (1981) show that this relationship (i.e. greater variance in the actual values than in forecasts) exists for the longer forecasting horizons and not for the shorter ones. This is because for shorter horizons, forecasters knowing the actual data, use their judgment to adjust estimates appropriately. Thus, as forecasts are a dynamic procedure, forecasters have to use their judgment during the entire process. However, such an effect does not necessarily mean that the dispersion or variation of forecasts follows the same pattern, Papers such as Lahiri & Sheng (2008) and illustrate how dispersion is greater at longer forecast horizons. More generally, both McNees (1990) and Donihue (1993) highlight the importance of judgmental adjustments on the predictive accuracy of econometric models. Lahiri & Sheng (2010) show how individual judgment can determine forecast uncertainty and in turn forecast accuracy.
There is also evidence that forecasters try to avoid large adjustments in their released forecasts (Scotese, 1994) . Batchelor & Dua (1991) observe that forecasters not only display conservatism in order to be closer to the consensus but that, more generally, they revise their estimates by less than warranted by new information. Instead, they prefer to wait until later revisions of data are available before adjusting their models. The findings of Isiklar et al. (2006) support this, reporting that it takes forecasters more than five months to incorporate 90% of new information. notes three possible reasons as to why forecasters may publish persistently biased forecasts. One is a lack of appropriate skills and the inability to efficiently incorporate new information. Forecasters may also fail to learn from past forecast errors and as a result they produce biased forecasts on an ongoing basis. The second reason is that forecasters may fail to differentiate between the changes in the target variable that are permanent and those which are transitory. Effectively, they may assign an equal weight to each component, resulting in biased forecasts. The third possible reason, as has already been noted, is the financial or reputational incentives that may lead to overly optimistic or pessimistic forecasts. However, despite those limitations the results do reveal a number of interesting elements, specifically evidence that herding is a common characteristic among forecasters. Bond & Mitchell (2011) also consider the IPF data, although in a different context. Their analysis compares the forecasting accuracy of the IPF Consensus Forecast for total returns versus implied forecasts derived from total return swap contracts. The results, interestingly, show that for a one-year horizon, the derivatives based implied forecasts display greater accuracy than the published consensus forecast.
3: Data
Since the late 1990's the IPF has surveyed a variety of property advisory firms, fund managers and financial institutions and asked them to provide forecasts of rental growth, capital value growth and total returns for the UK commercial real estate market 6 . Our analysis is able to expand upon that contained in previous work in a number of respects. Most importantly, we are able to consider not only the accuracy of the IPF Consensus Forecasts but also individual forecasters.
Secondly, by expanding the sample period through to 2011 we are able to consider whether accuracy varies over the course of a cycle. Finally, we also look at two-year forecasts as well as the one-year estimates.
The benchmark reference point specified is the return for the relevant annual index produced 
4: Empirical Results I: The Accuracy of the Consensus and the Dispersion of Individual Forecasters
The first component of the empirical analysis considers the accuracy of the IPF Consensus as well as a preliminary examination of the divergence and variation in the individual forecasts. Table 2 provides details on the consensus forecasts produced together with the actual outcomes for the three series considered for the one and two year forecast horizons. Figure 1 graphically depicts this information. Table 2 also includes the minimum and maximum individual forecast for each year as well as the range, mean forecast error, skewness and Jacque-Bera statistic for normality.
A number of issues are apparent from this initial examination of the data. Firstly, it is clear that the consensus tends to overestimate the three series in underperforming periods of the property market and vice versa. Throughout the strong conditions present between 2004-7 forecaster's consistently under-estimated market performance. In contrast, the extent of the market decline surrounding the 2007-8 financial crisis was substantially under-estimated. This finding is consistent with the broad macro-economic forecasting literature (e.g. Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993) . We can also see that forecasters have a tendency to be conservative in in their forecasts and avoid 'big numbers'.
In the broader forecasting literature, Scotese (1994) argues that forecasters seek to avoid sudden and large adjustments in order to try and maintain their reputation and credibility. The result of such behaviour is forecast smoothing. This impact can also be observed when one considers the variation of the consensus in comparison to the observed outcomes. Table 2 reports standard deviations for both the forecasted and actual outcomes and in each and every case the variability of the actual series is greater than the forecasts. This effect is more prominent in the two year horizons, consistent with papers such as Smyth & Ash (1981) . Furthermore, the volatility of the two year ahead forecasts is lower in each case when compared to the respective one year estimate. This does suggest increased conservatism over longer horizons. This may be possibly due to forecasters reverting back to the longrun average. It does however, need to be noted that a further possible factor behind the reduced variability is an averaging effect. An element of smoothing may be introduced into the consensus forecast due to it being estimated as the simple average of the individual forecasts.
In order to assess more fully assess the forecasts we use three standard measures of accuracy, namely; Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Mean Squared Error (MSE) and the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE). All of these measures are commonly used in the economic forecasting accuracy literature (e.g. Makridakis et. al., 1998; Clements et al., 2007; Lahiri & Sheng, 2010; Lenten, 2012) . The three measures are defined as below, and in each case the smaller the value the higher the degree of accuracy.
Where e is the forecast error (i.e. the difference between the actual and the forecast value) and n is the number of the forecasters. The MAE measure therefore avoids offsetting effects from large positive and negative errors. The Mean Square Error overcomes the same issue by squaring the forecast error rather than take the absolute error. In addition, by taking the square of the forecast error the measure is effectively penalizing more heavily forecasts with large errors. The Root Mean Squared Error is simply the square root of the MSE, thereby returning it to the same unit of measurement. These statistics are displayed in Table 3 .
It can be seen that the largest errors in the case of the capital and total returns are forecasts of Another feature of the results that is clearly evident is that the forecasts tend to display greater accuracy when the rental series is considered. This is the case for both horizons and in both phases of the last cycle and is noticeable in the findings in Table 2 as well as the more formal accuracy measures in Linden (2003) argues that significant skewness in the distribution of forecasts can be a signal of upside and downside risk, dependent on market conditions.
To complement the findings shown in Table' The greater forecasting accuracy with respect to rental growth can also be observed by considering the simple correlations of the actual values with the Consensus Forecasts. Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients between the consensus and actual figures. A statistically significant positive correlation (+0.74) between the one-year ahead forecast of rental growth and the observed results is found. In contrast, there is no significant correlation reported with respect to either capital or total returns, with the corresponding coefficients being 0.42 and 0.50 respectively. Furthermore, at no time do we see significant correlations in the case of the two-year ahead forecasts. However, it should be noted that in addition to the significant contemporaneous correlation observed in the case of the one-year rental growth forecasts, there is also evidence of a lagging effect, as seen in Figure 1 . It would appear that forecasters place a great degree of attention on the current year's performance when making subsequent forecasts. The correlation between rental forecasts and the actual performance of the rental index rises to 0.85 when lagged.
5: Empirical Results II: The Comparative Performance versus Naive Forecasts
As noted earlier in the paper, the Bond & Mitchell (2011) comparison between the IPF Consensus and forecasts implied from swap contract quotes saw the derivative based forecasts outperform over short-term one-year horizons. We expand upon this analysis to compare the performance of the consensus against two alternative naive forecasts. The first (Naive 1) assumes no change in the previous year's value, at the time the forecast was made. The second naive forecast (Naive 2) is based on the long-term average of the respective IPD index return, up to the point at which the forecast was made. For example, for forecasts made in 2002, the long-term average growth rates of the appropriate IPD index up to 2002 are used. This approach avoids potential bias through the incorporation of subsequent data into the naive forecast 9 . To compare the performance versus the alternative naive measures we use Theil's U2 statistic (Theil, 1966 (Theil, , 1971 , which can be represented (4) where F is the forecast and Y is the actual observation. Theil's U2 statistic can therefore be interpreted as dividing the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of the given forecast by the RMSE of a naive forecast. The statistic therefore provides the basis for comparing alternative forecasts relative to a naive forecast. If it has a value less than 1 the Consensus Forecast is better than those obtained by employing a naive forecast. If it has a value equal to 1, the forecasts add nothing, as the naive would be just as effective. If the value is greater than 1 the naive can be interpreted as having out-performed the Consensus.
The results are displayed in Tables 5 and 6 . Table 5 reports the Theil U2 statistics, whilst Table 6 provides a summary of the number of years in which the two naive forecasts outperformed the consensus. With respect to the rental growth series on five out of twelve occasions Naive 1 (the previous year's outcome) results in a lower error. In the case of Naive 2 (the long-term average up to the year of forecast) it outperformed on six of the twelve occasions. As for the two year ahead forecast period, in only two of the eleven years did Naive 1 outperform the consensus, whereas Naive 2 outperformed on four occasions. Therefore, the Consensus rental forecasts do outperform in the majority of years, a result that does provide some support in terms of the value of forecasts. However, as just noted, there is evidence that the one-year rent forecasts do have a strong relationship with the actual growth rates at the time of the forecast.
These findings are not however, repeated with the capital or total return data. The results support the preceding analysis in observing reduced accuracy with respect to capital and total return forecasts. When looking at the one-year ahead forecasts Naive 1 outperforms the consensus on seven and six occasions for capital and total returns respectively. In the case of Naive 2 this number increases to ten for both series. Similar levels of underperformance are also noted with respect to the two-year ahead forecasts, especially in the case of Naive 2, with it outperforming the consensus in eight out of eleven periods. It is of interest that most of the periods in which the consensus outperformed were towards the end of the sample. Intuitively the reverse may be expected given the There is also generally an improvement in the relative performance of the consensus forecasts in the case of the two year horizons. It may be that for the two year horizons (conditional) information on the outlook for the market is more accurately captured. These results also provide support to the results reported in Bond & Mitchell (2011) . Whereas they illustrated that the published consensus underperformed derivative based forecasts of total returns over short horizons, our findings show that even simple naive forecasts can display heightened accuracy.
6: Performance of Capital and Total Return Forecasts
A key finding in the empirical results is the disparity between the relative accuracy of rental growth forecasts in contrast to those of capital and total returns. This is not only evident in the reported accuracy of the Consensus Forecast but also that over a number of forecasting horizons the range of forecasts did not encompass the actual resulting growth rate. This was the case not only in 2007 and 2008 when we observed extreme negative returns in capital and total returns, but also during the boom years of 2003 through 2006. In each of these years not only did the Consensus underestimate capital value returns but so did each individual forecaster. The same observation can be made for total returns. Furthermore, the number of periods in which the Consensus forecasts for capital and total returns outperformed the alternative naive forecasts is far lower than is the case with the rental forecasts.
There are a number of issues potentially contributing to this heightened inaccuracy. were not only so large but why they also were the primary driving force in total returns. The key issue in the context of our analysis is whether this non-linearity was fully accounted for in the capital value growth forecasts. A result reported in Table 2 , and commented upon earlier in the paper warrants further mention. It was previously noted how the volatility of the forecasts of capital and total returns were not only far below the corresponding volatility of the actual index returns, but that they were more similar to those observed with respect to rental value growth. As we previously reported, the standard deviation of the actual annual capital and total return series is in excess of 10%, whereas the volatility of the corresponding forecast series were 4.38% and 4.66% respectively. This would provide some modicum of support to the notion that the forecasts did not capture the changing dynamics of capital and total returns in the sense that the volatility of the series rose substantially during the post 2002 period.
This issue is also related to other possible factors influencing forecast inaccuracy in capital value forecasts. As both Gallimore & McAllister (2005) and Bond & Mitchell (2010) note, it is often the case that such forecasts are not actually directly estimated, rather they are implied from forecasts of yields. However, if this is the case and forecasts of capital and total returns are being, at least part, derived from estimates of yields, then during periods of very low yields inaccuracies in such forecasts will be magnified when converted to imply capital value growth. This is due to a two-fold impact resulting from the non-linearity of the present value-yield relationship. Figure 5 illustrate this with a simple example. Figure 5 displays the initial yield series for the Annual IPD All Property Index together with the change in capital values implied by these yield changes based on a simple perpetuity valuation assumption. Figure 5 also reflects the 'forecasted' change in capital value based on an under-estimated movement in yield. This simple scenario is based upon a forecaster correctly gauging the direction of yields, however, they under-estimate the movement by half. For example, in 2004 the actual initial yield was 5.8687%, falling to 5.1604% a year later. We assume that the forecaster underestimated this downward shift by half, thus forecasting a yield of 5.5145%. A similar assumption is made in each year, with the implied capital growth based on these forecasted yields reported in Figure   5 . It can be seen that the implications for the capital value forecasters is significant. in each year. Therefore, the forecast error was magnified and enhanced when capital growth was implied from yield forecasts.
As previously noted presents three possible causes behind persistent bias, namely; a failure to efficiently incorporate new information; a failure to differentiate between permanent and transitory changes and finally behavioural elements such as financial or reputational incentives. Certainly behavioural elements may help to explain the lack of extreme forecasts and the presence of herding and conservatism in the forecasts. However, the first two of points are also of interest in the context of the capital and total return forecasts. Given the change in market dynamics it is possible that forecasts did not fully capture the shift towards a yield driven market, nor fully take into account the impact of the non-linearity at such low yields. It may be that either existing econometric models failed to either capture the degree of yield compression or that yield movements were dominating changes in capital value. In addition, it may be that forecasters failed to realise that the changes observed were not transitory.
In addition, as both Gallimore & McAllister (2005) and Bond & Mitchell (2010) note, formal econometric modelling is less common in the context of yields. Rather judgemental forecasts and overlay opinions are used to a greater extent with yields. Therefore, it may be that overlay opinions contributed to an under-statement of yield movements. One possible cause in this respect is the nature of traditional institutional investment. Institutional investors still largely adopt a more risk-averse investment strategy, one that involves low, if any, gearing, longer holding periods and a greater emphasis on income for their return. At the height of the market the low yield levels meant that many traditional institutions were facing conditions not conducive to their investment strategies. Rather, the low level of yields suited more aggressive investors who were focusing more upon capital appreciation over shorter holding periods. Effectively such investors could take advantage of the nonlinearity in the present value relationship. Furthermore, aided by the relatively easy availability of capital, such investors could further enhance their return by using high levels of gearing. It may therefore be that internal viewpoints, driven by the relative lack of viable investment opportunities for traditional property institutions influenced the forecasts.
7: Concluding Comments
This paper has considered the accuracy of forecasts of the UK real estate market. Based upon both the IPF Consensus Forecasts and the individual forecasts underpinning this figure, we find that forecasters tend to display conservatism. This results in under-estimation of return figures in both boom and crash conditions. This is consistent with, and provides quantitative support for, the qualitative interview findings reported in Gallimore & McAllister (2005) . There is also evidence of herding behaviour. It is of interest that the accuracy of the rental growth forecasts is substantially better than that reported with respect to capital and total returns. Based upon the Theil's U2 statistics, consensus forecasts of capital growth and total returns are no better and, indeed, worse on some 75
per cent of occasions than a naive forecasting rule. Furthermore, when the underlying individual forecasts are considered, the forecast ranges are much larger than with the rental growth forecasts.
The paper also discusses in depth the issue of the diverging accuracy of the rental versus capital and total return forecasts
It is important to recognise that it is impossible to isolate the specific source of forecasting error. Whilst econometric models are frequently adopted, judgemental adjustments, non-model-based information, are often made to augment pure 'model' generated forecasts, thus serving to incorporate expert knowledge. Information has value and expert adjustments reflect this. In other words, whilst models attempt to capture the broad systematic influences driving the property variables analysed, a host of other (model omitted) factors will at any point be impacting on rental growth, capital growth and total returns. Both Gallimore & McAllister (2005) and Watkins et al. (2012) note that most of the firms who provide data to IPF adjust their forecasts. We have no information as to which individual forecasts were purely quantitatively generated and which were subject to overlay adjustments and to what extent. Consequently, when evaluating 'forecast accuracy' we are unable to discern to what extent the measures we employ reflect such subjective adjustments. Correspondingly it is not possible to state categorically where the forecast inaccuracy is originating from and the degree to which either econometric or judgemental forecasts either enhance or distract from the accuracy of the forecasts made. As noted in the paper, biases can (are) introduced, thus rendering the forecasts less accurate than may otherwise have been the case. Indeed, the fact that the Naive Forecasts outperformed the capital value and total return forecasts so frequently does highlight that the use of simple quantitative forecasts would have frequently resulted in greater accuracy.
Whilst we have highlighted a number of possible causes of the forecasting errors observed there remain other factors that may also contribute and are worthy of future consideration. Firstly, whilst the IPF do specify that the respective IPD All Property Indices are the underlying benchmarks it is possible that firms are not directly constructing forecasts of these benchmarks. It may be that an overall forecast is derived from aggregating more specific forecasts. If this is common practice then additional inaccuracy may enter into the forecasting process due to aggregation effects. Secondly, it is also worth raising the question of whether forecasters are concentrating too much on modelling fundamental value rather than forecasting what is actually occurring in the market ? Potential biases may enter into either 'pure econometric' or 'judgementally enhanced' forecasts if the focus is on the estimation of economically justified returns. If relevant market factors are perceived as nonfundamental, even irrational, and thus excluded from the modelling framework, this may lead to additional forecasting errors being observed. Table 2 reports the actual annual return of the respective Annual IPD All Property Index, the IPF consensus forecast for that year and the number of forecasts that comprise the consensus. Summary statistics for the individual forecasts are also provided. Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients between the actual and forecasted returns based on the noted horizon. *** indicates a 1% level of significance. Table 6 reports the number of years in which the respective naive forecast outperformed the IPF Consensus. These are out of a total of 12 one-year ahead forecasts and 11 two-year estimates. The figures in parentheses report the percentage of years in which the naive forecasts outperformed. Naive 1 approach indicates the previous year growth-rate for the rental growth, capital growth and total returns and the Naive 2 is the long-term average of the actual values of the three property variables up to the date of forecasts. The relative performance is based upon the Theil U2 statistics reported in Table 5 .
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Figure 4: Decomposed IPD Capital Values Returns
Notes: Figure 4 shows the annual returns of the IPD capital and rental value series and the annual all property IPD Yield Impact series.
Figure 5: Implied Capital Value Changes based on Under-Estimated Yield Movements
Notes: the adjusted yield is based upon a forecast that captures 50% of the movement in the yield.
